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# Racial attitudes or racial ideology? An alternative paradigm for examining actors' racial views

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**ABSTRACT** *Most analysts of racism in the United States rely on surveys to make sense of actors' racial views and are oriented by methodological individualism. In contrast, a minority of scholars study actors' views as part of a racial ideology expressing their collective group interests. Nevertheless, these latter analysts have not developed a conceptual apparatus that can guide other researchers. My task in this article then is advancing a formal conceptualization of racial ideology and operationalizing it to facilitate using it in research. Using data from the 1998 Detroit Area Study, I illustrate the elements of this paradigm. In the explication of the various components of this paradigm, I discuss the central features of contemporary racial ideology in the United States which I label 'colour blind racism'. I conclude with a short discussion of the implications of this paradigm and of colour blind racism.*

Ideas, to repeat a commonplace, do not exist in a vacuum. They are expressions of social forces, and explanations or rationalizations of observed phenomena.

Iclus A. Newby<sup>1</sup>

From the premier work of Theodore Adorno and Gordon Allport, mainstream social analysts have relied on surveys as the chief instrument for assessing actors' racial attitudes. The conceptual framework that orients most of their work is rather simple: prejudice → attitudes → discrimination.<sup>2</sup> However, the most salient element missing in their conceptual scheme is an analysis of power dynamics: that is, these researchers do not connect racial beliefs to a system of racial domination. Although Allport, unlike many of his contemporary followers, attempted to explain prejudicial attitudes as the product of multiple forces, his analysis was still essentially wedded to methodological individualism and not connected to a system of racial domination. This conceptual limitation has led

these researchers to a ‘clinical approach’ on racial attitudes—the search for prejudiced and tolerant individuals in societies.

Because of its limitations, traditional survey research underestimates the extent of race-based beliefs among whites in contemporary America. This underestimation results from two related problems. First, because post-civil rights racial dynamics and dilemmas have changed,<sup>3</sup> researchers relying on questions developed to measure racial attitudes in the Jim Crow era<sup>4</sup> systematically overestimate the level of tolerance among whites. Second, because most surveys provide a limited analytical context—often the somewhat mysterious meaning of check marks on restricted questions and items—researchers *assume* the meaning of ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ answers in their surveys and the interpretation of their findings is not straightforward.

In sharp contrast to survey researchers, most qualitative researchers conceive of ‘racism’ as having a structural foundation. Whether the product of colonized class dynamics, racialized class dynamics, or racial dynamics,<sup>5</sup> these authors contend that ‘racism’ has a *collective* nature and thus affects the consciousness of *all* actors in any society. Therefore, for these analysts ‘racism’ is not a free-floating ideology but intrinsically connected to the field of racialized social relations. Accordingly, these analysts are more concerned with extracting larger common frames from their data than with attitudinal variation among individuals. Furthermore, whereas most survey researchers rely on ‘yes’ and ‘no’ type of questions to make sense of respondents’ positions on very complex racial matters, qualitative researchers base their research on ethnographies, interviews, discourse analysis, and focus groups which allow them to get a deeper understanding of respondents’ views.

Qualitative researchers in the United States have been joined recently by a growing number of survey analysts who, following the central work of Blumer, analyse racial views from a broader perspective.<sup>6</sup> Their analysis, which is compatible with the theorization I develop in this article, has uncovered many features of post-civil rights racial ideology. However, because these analysts still depend heavily on survey data, they have not been able to uncover important components of the ideological material used by whites to justify racial inequality. For example, because of the very nature of survey data, these analysts are hard pressed to identify whites’ contemporary racetalk (specific linguistic ways of articulating racial views), specific rationalizations for racial inequality, deep cognitive connections between frames and racial issues, and racial stories (see below).

In this article I do three things. First, I make a strong case for shifting the paradigm for examining actors’ racial views from the individualistic framework of the prejudice paradigm to the group-based framework of the racial ideology paradigm. Second, because the racial ideology paradigm has not been properly defined, I propose a conceptual apparatus to explicate how we ought to conceive and study racial ideology. I anchor my theorization on a structural interpretation of ‘racism’ and the work on ideology and discourse of van Dijk and Jackman.<sup>7</sup> Third, I illustrate the components and primary social functions of racial ideology

with contemporary examples of 'colour blind racism'<sup>8</sup> from the 1998 Detroit Area Study (DAS henceforth).<sup>9</sup> Hence, although my central goal in this paper is theoretical, I also describe the basic features of the dominant racial ideology in the contemporary United States.

### The racial ideology paradigm defined

All social life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

Karl Marx, Eighth Thesis on Feuerbach<sup>10</sup>

What social forces are expressed through individuals' racial views? I contend that individuals' racial views fundamentally express at the semiotic level the dynamics of *real* race relations. Although races, as social categories such as class and gender, are socially constructed and thus permanently unstable categories of human identity and action, after they emerge in any society they organize diverse forms of hierarchy that produce social relations of domination and subordination. Thus, as Hanchard has argued, race operates 'as a shuttle between socially constructed meanings and practices, between subjective and lived, material reality'.<sup>11</sup> The engine that makes races—and race relations—socially *real* is that in 'racialized social systems'<sup>12</sup> the race ascribed the superior position receives economic, political, social, and even psychological ('I may be poor, but at least I am not black') advantages while the race—or races—ascribed the inferior position receives disadvantages. Not surprisingly, these groups become *social collectivities* with different interests: the dominant race tends to defend, justify, or accept the racial order, whereas the other race, or races, attempt to change their position through various means.

Based on the preceding arguments, I suggest that a more fruitful approach for examining actors' racial views is the notion of *racial ideology*, or *the racially-based frameworks used by actors to explain and justify* (dominant race) or *challenge* (subordinate race or races) *the racial status quo*. Although modern societies articulate various forms of hierarchy and, thus, societal ideology encompasses frames from gender, racial, class, and other forms of hierarchical structurations, I focus here on how aspects of the larger 'ideological ensemble'<sup>13</sup> play out in the field of race relations. I label these frameworks 'racial' albeit I recognize that many (e.g. the frame of *abstract liberalism*) are used to justify gender and class inequality.

Notwithstanding that all races have the *capacity* to develop these frameworks, those of the dominant race become the master frameworks upon which all actors ground (for or against) their ideological positions. Why is this the case? Adapting Marx's argument to situations of racial domination, which some Marxist scholars have suggested can be done,<sup>14</sup> explains why the ideas of the dominant race tend to be the dominant ideas.

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class

which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its domination.<sup>15</sup>

But what is the foundation of these frameworks? From the ideology paradigm standpoint, these frameworks are rooted in the group-based life conditions and experiences of the races. These frameworks are the *social representations*<sup>16</sup> of the races: that is, the conscious and unconscious sum of ideas, prejudices, and myths that crystallize the victories and defeats of the races regarding how the world is and ought to be organized. According to Jeffrey Prager,<sup>17</sup> these frameworks embody the cultural material of ‘dead generations’ and operate as ‘public world-view[s], capable of being articulated, collectively arrived at, negotiated, and systematically organized through public channels’.

Despite the fact that the dominant racial ideology crystallizes the interests of the dominant race, that ideology is not fixed but highly interactive. The flexibility of the dominant racial ideology enhances its legitimizing role because it allows for accommodation of contradictions, exceptions, and new information. As Jackman points out, ‘Indeed, the strength of an ideology lies in its loose-jointed, flexible application. *An ideology is a political instrument, not an exercise in personal logic*: consistency is rigidity, the only pragmatic effect of which is to box oneself in’.<sup>18</sup> The interactivity of the dominant racial ideology stems from divisions between segments *within* the dominant race as well as from debates *between* the races. For instance, white élites, because of their special location in the complex matrix of domination typical of modern societies, exert an inordinate influence on the ideas of white masses. However, it is a mistake to interpret whites’ racial views as the *direct* effect of the ideological work of white élites. Poor and middle-class whites are not passive repositories of some ‘objective interests’ or supra-consciousness that tells them what to believe, say, feel, or do when in the presence of racial minorities. Instead, the white masses have some real agency, that is, they participate in the construction, development, and transformation of racial ideology since, after all, it is in their racial interest to maintain white supremacy. Although élites attempt to sell their particular *racial projects*<sup>19</sup> to the masses, the masses themselves are agents in the production and refinement of these projects. For example, although the present racial crisis in the United States is *partly* the result of how neo-conservatives, the Far Right, the Reagan Revolution, Clinton’s neo-liberal policies, and more recently, George Bush’s ‘compassionate conservatism’ have played out in a context of economic decline, the efforts of these groups have worked *through* the long-standing racial divisions in America. When white workers express views such as ‘They don’t want to work, because if they did, there wouldn’t be so many of them selling drugs and getting in all kinds of problems’,<sup>20</sup> they are not just repeating élite views but expressing their race-based resentment toward minorities based on their own experiences. Indeed, élite segments of racial

groups are in strategically advantageous positions for influencing the 'public', but their views and projects are not 'simply imposed, inculcated, or otherwise passively adopted by the public'.<sup>21</sup>

The agency of the white masses also implies that individual members of the dominant race can become 'ideological dissidents' or 'race traitors'.<sup>22</sup> For example, intellectual, moral, or political concerns have led many individual whites to challenge racial inequality throughout history. Yet, the William Lloyd Garrisons and John Browns (whites who struggled for the abolition of slavery) have always been a minority since committing racial treason involves going against your collective interests. In practice, members of the subordinate race(s) are more likely to commit racial treason since individuals who do so can improve their standing (e.g. in the post-civil rights era, anti-minority individuals such as Ward Connerly, Clarence Thomas, and Linda Chavez are handsomely compensated).

The interactivity of the dominant racial ideology also evinces the process of 'racial contestation'<sup>23</sup> between the races at all levels. Although as I stated above, the ideas of the dominant race *tend* to be the dominant ideas in society, ideological rule over the subordinate race(s) is never absolute, is always at best partial, and is always contested. For example, if the United States has a new set of dominant racial frames (see Table 1 below), it is because struggles in the past (civil rights movements, race-based rebellions in ghettos, etc.) led to a change in the 'racial structure'—the specific social, political, and economic practices and social arrangements that help reproduce racial domination. However, the new, post-civil rights racial ideology incorporated many of the ideas endorsed by racial minorities in the 'sixties (equality of opportunity for all, eradication of racist statements as illegitimate in public discourse, censorship of racist views on the supposed biological-moral character of blacks, etc.) but in a *hegemonic* way, that is, by including them in a manner that does not threaten white supremacy.

To facilitate using the racial ideology paradigm in research, I propose conceiving racial ideology as an *interpretative repertoire*<sup>24</sup> consisting of the following three elements: frames, style or racetalk, and racial stories. Individual actors employ these elements as 'building blocks ... for manufacturing versions on actions, self, and social structures' in communicative situations. The looseness of the elements allows users to manoeuvre various contexts (e.g. responding to a race-related survey, discussing racial issues with family, or arguing about affirmative action in a college classroom) and produce various accounts and presentations of self (e.g. appearing ambivalent, tolerant, or strong-minded). Although individual members of races may exhibit considerable rhetorical, stylistic, and even affective variations, analysts can determine whether they are breaking with the dominant repertoire, that is, if they are relying on a different ideology altogether.

*The first and most important element of an interpretive repertoire is its frames or topics central to the maintenance (or challenge) of a racial order.* Although many frames have a long and deep history—e.g. racially-based fear of the 'Other', association of blackness with criminality, etc.—most are directly related

to the *specific* needs associated with the reproduction of a particular racial order. These frames embody 'folk theories' that individuals use to explain race-related matters. For example, during the Jim Crow era, the ideology of the colour line, in contrast to the ideology of slavery which emphasized blacks' sub-humanity and natural servility, focused on keeping blacks 'in their place'.

The civil rights rebellion, in conjunction with other social, economic, and demographic changes that transpired in the 1960s, dramatically altered the nature of America's racial structure. No longer do blacks and other minorities face the indignities of having to sit at the back of the bus or of confronting signs stating 'No blacks and Mexicans allowed'. Nevertheless, the death of Jim Crow has not meant the death of white supremacy. Instead, as several analysts have argued, a 'new racism' has replaced the old racial structure.<sup>25</sup> In contemporary America racial privilege is reproduced in a mostly covert, institutional, and apparently non-racial manner that does not depend on overt expressions of hostility. For example, whereas blacks and Latinos were excluded through housing covenants and racial terror from certain neighbourhoods in the past, today racial exclusion is accomplished through steering by 'realtors', not advertising units, and unequal access to loans. Similarly, whereas racial privilege in the economic realm was maintained by reserving the good jobs for whites and by paying minorities less than whites when they worked in the same jobs, today the economic shackles are reproduced through strategies such as testing which is not relevant to job performance, advertising of jobs in factories where racial minorities have little representation, and by racializing jobs even at the top of the occupational structure.<sup>26</sup>

Accordingly, post-civil rights racial ideology reflects the character of the new racial order. Instead of relying on an in-your-face set of beliefs ('Minorities are behind us because they are stupid or biologically inferior'), the new ideology is as indirect, slippery, and apparently non-racial as the new ways of maintaining racial privilege. I label this new ideology *colour blind racism* and argue that it is centrally anchored in the abstract extension of egalitarian values to racial minorities and the notion that racial minorities are culturally rather than biologically deficient. I summarize the central frames of colour blind racism in Table 1. Below I describe two of the frames of colour blind racism (*abstract liberalism* and *naturalization*) and provide examples of how whites use them.

The most important frame of colour blind racism is *abstract liberalism*. When minorities were slaves, contract laborers, or 'braceros' (Mexicans brought as agricultural workers), the principles of liberalism and humanism were not extended to them. Today whites extend the ideas associated with liberalism to minorities, but in an abstract way that rationalizes racially unfair situations. Because of the curious way in which liberalism's principles are used in the post-civil rights era, other analysts label modern racial ideology 'laissez-faire racism' or 'competitive racism' or argue that modern racism is essentially a combination of the 'American Creed' with anti-black resentment.<sup>27</sup> The importance of this frame is evident in that whites use it on a host of issues ranging from affirmative action and interracial friendship and marriage to neighbourhood and

**Table 1.** Central frames of colour blind racism

(1) *Abstract liberalism*: This frame incorporates tenets associated with political (e.g., 'equal opportunity', the idea that force should not be used to achieve social policy, etc.) and economic (e.g., choice and individualism) liberalism in an abstract and decontextualized manner. By framing race-related issues in the language of liberalism, whites can appear 'reasonable' and even 'moral' while opposing almost all practical approaches to deal with *de facto* racial inequality. For instance, by using the tenets of the free market ideology in the abstract, they can oppose affirmative action as a violation of the norm of equal opportunity.

(2) *Naturalization*: Naturalization is a frame that allows whites to explain away racial phenomena by suggesting that they are natural occurrences. For example, by claiming that 'segregation' is natural, that people from all backgrounds 'gravitate toward likeness', or that racially-based preferences for friends and partners are just 'the way things are', whites can present their taste for whiteness as a non-racial matter since 'blacks do it too'.

(3) *Biologization of culture*: This frame uses culturally-based arguments such as 'blacks do not put much emphasis on education' or 'they have too many babies' to explain blacks' position in society. Because this cultural rationale is discussed as something that is somewhat fixed ('I don't know why, but blacks are not able to do the right things in life'), I suggest that it has biologized culture: that is, it has presented minorities' culture as something unchangeable.

(4) *Minimization of racism*: This frame involves minimizing the significance of discrimination in the United States ('It's better now than in the past' or 'There is discrimination, but there are plenty of jobs out there'). Therefore, whites can accept facts such as the racially motivated murder of James Byrd, Jr, in Jasper, Texas,<sup>1</sup> the brutal police attack on Rodney King, and other publicly ventilated cases such as the Texaco case,<sup>2</sup> and still accuse blacks of being 'hypersensitive', of using race as an 'excuse', or of 'playing the race card'.

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1. James Byrd was a black man murdered by three white supremacist ex-cons in 1998 in Jasper, Texas.

2. High-level Texaco executives were caught on tape saying some racially insensitive things about blacks and other minorities a few years back which led them to settle a lawsuit brought by minority employees accusing the company of racial discrimination in pay and promotion.

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residential segregation. An astounding 96 per cent of white DAS respondents (88 per cent on affirmative action alone) used this frame in their answers. An example of how whites use this frame is Eric, a corporate auditor in his forties who erupted in anger when asked whether reparations were due to blacks for the injuries caused by slavery and Jim Crow.

[In a loud and angry tone] Oh tell them to shut up, OK! I had nothing to do with the whole situation. The opportunity is there, there is no reparation involved and let's not dwell on it. I'm very opinionated about that!

After suggesting that Jews and Japanese are the ones who really deserve reparation, Eric added:

But something that happened three Goddamned generations ago, what do you want us to do about it now? Give them opportunity, give them scholarships, but reparations?

Was Eric just a white with a 'principled opposition' to government intervention as many analysts contend?<sup>28</sup> This does not seem to be the case as Eric, like most

whites in the DAS, made a distinction between government spending on behalf of victims of child abuse, the homeless, and battered women (whom whites deem as legitimate candidates for assistance) and government spending on minorities' behalf (whom whites deem as unworthy candidates for assistance). This finding was consistent with our DAS survey results. For instance, whereas 64.3 per cent of whites agreed that 'we should expand the services that benefit the poor', only 39.6 per cent (84 per cent of blacks) agreed with the proposition, 'The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks living in the United States'. Furthermore, the same pattern appeared in questions dealing with the specific issue of increasing government spending on various programmes. Whereas 75.2 per cent approved of increasing federal spending for the environment and 59.7 per cent for social security, only 31.7 per cent approved such increases for programmes to assist blacks.

Another frame of colour blind racism, which has not yet been brought to the fore by social scientists, is whites' *naturalization* of race-related matters. This frame is used by whites mostly to explain the existence of school or neighbourhood segregation, the limited contact between whites and minorities, and their preference for whites as significant others. The word 'natural' or the phrase 'that's the way it is' is often interjected to normalize events or actions that could otherwise be interpreted as racist. An example of how whites use this frame is Jim, a thirty-year-old computer software salesperson for a large company, who naturalized school segregation as follows:

Eh, you know, it's more of the human nature's fault. It's not the government's fault, right? The government doesn't tell people where to live. So as people decide where to live or where to move into or where they wanna feel comfortable, [they] move to where they feel comfortable. We all kinda hang out with people that are like us. I mean, you look at Detroit, we have a Mexican village, why do we have a Mexican village? Why aren't Mexican people spread out all over on metro Detroit? Well, they like being near other Mexican people that way they could have a store that suited them close by the, you know, those sort of things probably together. So, it's more human nature that I would blame for it.

Clearly Jim believes that school and residential segregation are the product of 'human nature' and, therefore, they are no one's fault. Although social scientists have amply documented the social processes behind segregation,<sup>29</sup> this view prevents whites from supporting any policy to resolve or even ameliorate the problem.

*The second component of an interpretative repertoires is its style or racetalk—the idiosyncratic linguistic manners and rhetorical strategies used to articulate racial viewpoints.* For example, whites' racetalk during the Jim Crow era, in consonance with the colour line ideology, was direct and blunt. Whites did not hesitate to express their racial views in a direct manner in public as well as private situations.<sup>30</sup> In sharp contrast, because the normative climate of what can be said in public changed dramatically in the 1960s, the language of colour blind racism is slippery, apparently contradictory, and subtle. The major stylistic elements of colour blind racism are: (1) *avoidance of racist terminology*, (2)

*semantic moves to avoid been labelled as racist (racetalk), (3) diminutives, (4) projection, and (5) rhetorical incoherence.*

Since a complete analysis of the stylistic elements of colour blindness is beyond the scope of this article, I just showcase two of its five elements.<sup>31</sup> First, I illustrate ‘semantic moves’ or rhetorical shields to avoid the appearance of racism and, secondly, I address the role of projection. Semantic moves such as ‘I am not a racist’ or ‘Some of my best friends are black’ have become standard fare of post-civil rights racial discourse. An example of how whites use these phrases, is Rhonda, a part-time employee in a jewellery store. She inserted the ‘I am not a racist’ phrase to express her problematic views on blacks safely.

Well, I’m gonna be, I’m gonna be, you understand I’m, I’m [not] *prejudice[d] or racial or whatever*. Ah, they’ve always given the ah, slut ... smut jobs ... because they would do it. Then they stopped, they stopped doing. Ah, welfare system got to be very, very easy. And I’m not saying all, there’s many, many white people on welfare that shouldn’t be. But if you take the percentage in the tri-city country area, you will find that the majority are white, but all you see is the black people on welfare, but it’s a graduation up .... Thirty years ago they started it and they continued it, and they continued it, and they continued it. And it was casier to collect wel ... ah ah, you know, welfare from the state rather than go out and get a job. Why work if, if they gonna, if the government’s gonna take care of you?

In short, Rhonda believes blacks are lazy and prefer to be on welfare than to work. However, by saying, ‘I’m, I’m [not] prejudice or racial or whatever’, Rhonda deflected the potential charge that she is racist.

Psychologists know that projection is part of our normal equipment to defend ourselves. It is also an essential tool in the creation of a corporate identity (Us versus Them). More pertinent to my analysis, paranoid projection helps us ‘escape from guilt and responsibility and affix blame elsewhere’.<sup>32</sup> Whites’ projections appear on a variety of issues (e.g. affirmative action, school and residential segregation, interracial friendship and marriage, and blacks’ work ethic), but most often on the hot issue of so-called black self-segregation (‘Why do you guys keep to yourself? Why are you clannish?’). Twenty-two of the sixty-six white respondents in the DAS interviews projected racial motivations onto blacks. For example Ann, an unemployed woman in her twenties, answered the question on whether blacks are hard to approach or are not welcomed by whites as follows:

I think that, I don’t know—they live too much on the past, if you ask me. Some of ‘em do. You know, I think blacks are more prejudiced against whites than whites are against blacks.

Francine, a homemaker in her late twenties, answered a question on why blacks and whites see the police and the criminal court system very differently in the following way:

Black people are just prejudiced. They just think that they’re out to get them or something.

Both examples show how whites project racism onto blacks as a way of avoiding responsibility and feeling good about themselves.

*The third element of an interpretive repertoire is racial stories which are narratives that appear over and over in the justifications (or criticisms) used to maintain (or challenge) racial privilege.* All racialized social systems produce dominant common stories that become part of the racial folklore and hence are shared, used, and believed by members of the dominant race. What makes racial stories 'ideological' is their social commonality; the fact that users and listeners share a representational world that makes these stories seem factual. Hence, by telling and retelling these storylines, members of a social group strengthen their collective understanding about how and why the world is the way it is. Benjamin DeMott describes the role of racial stories in preserving racial hierarchy as follows:

These stories are no minor elements in the structure of caste: they are narrative rationales determining attitudes, motivations, habits, skills, and values. *And, because bottom-caste and mainstream stories differ vastly from each other, they* (in combination with the differences in work, property, and schooling that they 'explain') *effectively locate most of the bottom-caste and most of the mainstream psychocultural worlds.*<sup>33</sup>

There are two kind of racial stories: storylines and testimonies. Storylines are *socially shared tales that are fable-like and incorporate a common scheme and wording.* Storylines are fable-like because, unlike testimonies (see below), they are often based on impersonal, generic arguments with little narrative content. The characters in these stories, if any, tend to be underdeveloped and are usually social types (e.g. the 'black man' in statements such as 'My best friend lost a job to a black man' or the 'welfare queen' in 'Black women are welfare queens'). The schemata in these stories, and the reason for calling them storylines, refers to phrases and words that appear in most accounts (e.g. 'I think that the *past is the past*'). Testimonies, however, are *accounts where the narrator is a central participant in the story or is close to the characters in the story.* Testimonies provide the aura of authenticity and emotionality that only 'first hand' narratives can furnish ('I know this for a fact since I have worked all my life with blacks'). Therefore, these stories assist those who narrate them in gaining sympathy from listeners or in persuading them about points they want to convey. Most testimonies whites tell serve rhetorical functions such as saving face or signifying non-racialism or bolstering their arguments on controversial racial matters.

In the post-civil rights era, whites have produced to date four storylines: (1) 'The past is the past' (a related storyline is 'Present generations are not responsible for the mistakes of the past'), (2) 'I didn't own slaves', (3) 'My (friend or relative) didn't get a (job or promotion) because a black (usually 'man') got it', and (4) 'If (Jews, Irish, Asians) have made it, how come blacks have not?'. An example of how whites use these storylines is Diana, an employment manager in her late twenties, who inserted storylines (1) and (2) in her answer to a question on government assistance to blacks.

No, and I, you know, I have to say that I'm pretty supportive of ... anything to help people, but um .... I don't know why that slavery thing has a ... I've got a chip on my shoulder about that. *It's like it happened so long ago* and yeah you've got these 16 year old kids .... saying 'Well, I deserve this because my great great granddaddy was a slave'. Well, you know what, that doesn't affect you. *Me, as white person, I had nothing to do with slavery.* You as a black person, you never experienced it. *It was ... so long ago*, I just don't see how that pertains to ... what's happening to the race today. *So ... you know, that's one thing that I'm just like 'God, shut up!' You know, it, it's so long ago, get over it!* Um, you know, it's kinda like the South still thinking the Civil War was yesterday. [Interviewer: 'Right'.] Yeah, no, I, those are things I just feel like '*Let it go*'.

Here Diana combined 'The past is the past' with a mild version of 'I didn't own any slaves' ('Me, as white person, I had nothing to do with slavery') to state her opposition to race-targeted programmes.

The role of testimonies in the colour blind drama cannot be underestimated. Almost every white DAS respondent used them for rhetorical purposes such as saving face, to signify non-racialism, or to bolster an argument. One racial story that appeared quite often was stories of positive or negative interactions with minorities. Stories of negative interaction with blacks are used to bolster a negative assessment on blacks and positive stories are used to present an image of multiculturalism. An example of how negative stories of interaction are used by whites is Joan, a video store employee in her late thirties, who told the following story:

Like black people, they use their excuse that they're black and that's the reason why white people won't be accepting me [sic]. I've seen it too. I had this black person, for instance, who chewed me out at *Videobuster*. Yelled at me a year ago. Started calling me a white Honky and every racist slur that you could think of happened. My uncle showed up, you know, he works for the government and I get to see him often. He came in and I was in tears 'cause I was not brought up that way. This woman was totally flabbergasted because my uncle asked her if she had a problem and told her I was his niece. I just gave him a hug. This woman was calling me names that were totally uncalled for. She did not have a receipt. I wouldn't—I do it with everybody. You do not have a receipt, you don't get an exchange. She tried to return our products, our store rentals without store code on it as a gift from someone else. She said I was accusing her of stealing it from the store. I could not refund the money. She called me racial names.

Joan's story and case is very interesting because she considers herself white even though she claims to have black and American Indian ancestry. She was coded as white (and apparently looked the part) because in the original survey she had stated that she was white. The 'uncle' she refers to in this story is a black man, but in truth he is just her godfather. The rhetorical goal of this particular story was to punctuate her belief that blacks use race as an excuse, a belief that she repeated often.

### **The social functions of racial ideology**

Racial ideology *expresses* the fact that societies are divided along racial lines. As such, racial ideology has inscribed the indelible marks of racial domination

and contestation. As I suggested above, although the frameworks of the dominant race loom large in the ideational world of subordinate races, the dominant racial ideology is not all-mighty since it incorporates common themes from subordinate races (albeit in a hegemonic way) and thus has contradictory elements in it. But racial ideology is more than the mere expression of a society divided along racial lines. Racial ideology is the *medium* through which racial life is apprehended, through which individuals perceive themselves as 'Same' or as 'Others'. In Althusserian terms,<sup>34</sup> racial ideology interpellates individuals as *racial subjects*. This medium thus expresses racial relations but becomes, for actors interpellated as racial subjects, indistinguishable from lived experience. In short, we create racial ideology and racial ideology creates us.

Since racial ideology is the medium through which actors live their (racial) life, racial ideology helps 'structurate' their lives in at least five ways. *First, racial ideology helps structurate<sup>35</sup> the racial order by providing arguments to account for racial inequality.* Racial ideology, again borrowing from Althusser, accomplishes this rationalizing task by representing not the real but the *imaginary* relations among the races. For instance, slave masters proclaimed that blacks' status was due to their sub-humanity and hence argued whites had to 'care' for them. In the Jim Crow era, the racial ideology justified racial inequality by naturalizing the position of blacks and whites in society in biological and moral terms.

Nevertheless, rationalizations of inequality need not be based on overtly negative views about racial minorities in order to be effective. As Mary Jackman observes: 'Groups who dominate social relationships strive to keep hostility out of those relationships, not in order to foster equality, but rather to deepen and secure the inequality. *They have learned that persuasion is better than force*'.<sup>36</sup> For example, the arguments used by whites today to justify the racial *status quo* are seemingly non-racial, rely on cultural rather than biological explanations, and are centrally based on the principles of liberalism and individualism (see Table 1 above). Furthermore, the racial character of ideology and ideological practices is, as David Theo Goldberg argues, 'normal to our culture, manifest not only in extreme epithets but in insinuations and suggestions, in reasoning and representations, in short, in the microexpressions of daily life'.<sup>37</sup> Finally, in some racialized societies, racial ideology is present even without the *formal* recognition of the existence of race relations as is the case of numerous countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico.

Despite the centrality of the frameworks of the dominant racial group in the ideological ensemble of a society, they do not rule completely the intellectual and moral life of subordinate races. Since the objective social, economic, and political conditions experienced by subordinate races are substantially different from those of the dominant race, they develop alternative frameworks to explain their position in society. For example, during slavery, enslaved Africans created their own spiritual, linguistic, familial, and musical world. Not surprisingly, they developed counter-views on slavery and strategies to resist their oppressions that

ranged from slow-downs to the 250 rebellions and conspiracies.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, in the Jim Crow era, blacks built a culture that represented 'at least a partial rejection of the dominant ideology'.<sup>39</sup>

However, dominant racial ideologies muddle the ideological terrain of subordinate races, hence limiting the likelihood of them developing fully coherent utopias and, at times, even making resistance unimaginable. For instance, Tyrone, an unemployed black man in his early forties and one of the most race conscious blacks interviewed in the 1998 DAS, exhibited this ideological confusion. Tyrone, who had progressive views on most issues, floundered on the policies to accomplish integration. Although he supported residential integration, he opposed government intervention to guarantee it.

Well, you can't tell people where [to] live. They got to pay for their own house, so people are going to live where they want to live. So you can't do that.

Tyrone uses the frame of abstract liberalism ('you can't tell people where to live') and the free market rationale ('They got to pay for their own house, so ...') to oppose government intervention to deal with one of the central social processes behind blacks' contemporary plight in America. Interpreting Tyrone's stance on government intervention as a mere political preference does not square with the fact that he was a strong supporter of affirmative action, government programmes for blacks, and even of reparations.<sup>40</sup> For example, he voiced his support for reparations with the following strong words:

They should get something, [*respondent raises his voice*] they should get something. They was suppose to give the black man 40 acres and a mule, *where's my 40 acres of land at or my money that you going to pay me for these 40 acres I was supposed to get? You know, give me a tractor, give me some money, give me something!*

*Secondly, racial ideology provides the basic rules of engagement for racial actors (the 'racial etiquette') as well as the racial episteme to make decisions about 'Other' and 'Same'. As Charles Johnson pointed out long time ago, racial dogmas 'constitute something more than folklore or a creed of faith; they form a charter for social conduct'.<sup>41</sup> At the time that Johnson was writing, racial dogmas prescribed very specific rules for interracial contact in all sorts of situations ranging from the door that blacks had to use when entering a house owned by a white to forbidding direct eye contact between whites and blacks in public spaces. Today, in the period of hegemonic racial domination, racial dogmas have become almost second nature.*

Post-civil rights racial dogmas allow things such as (a) whites claiming that it is legitimate to fear all blacks, (b) whites raising a self-defence legal strategy when they kill innocent blacks in a variety of situations in which they perceive them as threatening, (c) a white woman to demand workers' compensation by claiming that she could not continue working in a majority minority environment after being attacked by a black man, and (d) a department chair to assume that a black professor can teach an introductory course on African-American thought even though she does not have any background in the area.<sup>42</sup>

*Thirdly, racial ideology provides the basic script for actors' racial subjectivity.* In a racialized society, *all* actors develop a racial identity (are racialized) as part of their sense of self. This happens whether actors are 'aware' of it or not and whether they want it or not. Individuals' cognitions are always embedded in the social world and thus their acts of self-recognition are always racialized. The routine way in which racial subjectivity is reproduced everyday, reinforced by numerous personal (e.g. residential and school segregation, limited interracial marriage and friendship, etc.) and institutional practices (e.g. racial rules for political access, immigration policies, census taking, etc.) allows dominant actors to develop their racial identity in an almost imperceptible manner.<sup>43</sup> Although whiteness, as a form of group identity in the United States, was historically shaped in reference to subordinate 'Others', whether Indians, Chicanos, or blacks, or by the real struggle of phenotypically light ethnic groups to be recognized as whites, it does not need to be elaborated in clear and overt terms. After its initial creation, whiteness becomes *normalized* despite the fact that it is continuously being rebuilt.

Racial subjectivity emerges even in societies where race is not formally recognized as a social category, as in Latin American and Caribbean societies, or as in the United States today, where the very existence and significance of race is openly denied by whites ('We are colour blind').<sup>44</sup> One of the most potent attributes of contemporary whiteness in the United States is precisely its invisibility. Since the abolition of the *formal* statutes of Jim Crow, whites contend that 'white racism' is in retreat. Yet *formal* institutional and *informal* practices by individuals have maintained high levels of residential, school, and social segregation. Whites today, despite the virtual elimination of Jim Crow, live fundamentally 'white lives' characterized by (1) neighbourhoods that are almost completely white, (2) schools that are primarily white, (3) associational practices of friendship, church attendance, and social clubs that are virtually white except for the incorporation of Asians and some Latinos as 'honorary whites', and (4) various practices that preserve the white character of their lives even in so-called integrated jobs, schools, and neighbourhoods. Furthermore, cultural representations of blacks, whites, and other racial groups on television, print media, and movies consumed daily as entertainment or 'news', allow whites to be 'racial tourists, distant observers to the racist images and narratives' or foster racial liberalism in which racism 'has little or nothing to do with promoting power, racial privilege, and a sense of moral agency in the lives of Whites'.<sup>45</sup>

*Fourthly, racial ideology is systemic or global: that is, all social actors are affected by it.* In racialized social systems it is impossible for any individual to be a non-racial actor and, as such, not to be shaped by racial ideology. Since all actors are interpellated as racial subjects, they acquire through the socialization process the ideological ammunition to explain their position in society. In racial orders where force is central to their reproduction (e.g. slavery, Jim Crow, apartheid, fascist regimes), the frameworks of the dominant race are less central in shaping the views of subordinate actors. For example, the influence of whites'

frameworks on blacks during slavery and Jim Crow was minimal largely because the social, economic, and political relations between the races were based on coercion and, thus, the dominant race did not attempt to rule blacks' civil society. As domination through coercion became costly, unstable, and ultimately ineffective, racial domination became hegemonic.<sup>46</sup> In most contemporary racial orders, the dominant race seeks to maintain its power through *consent*, that is, by actively seeking to convince oppressed groups to accept their norms, views, and practices as 'this is the way the world is', as the 'normal' framework of reference.

The following examples of how whites' views United States have affected blacks' views should suffice to illustrate the global effect of racial ideology. First, blacks have historically internalized white supremacist standards of beauty and even recreated a colour-based caste structure. Secondly, blacks have historically accepted many of the stereotypes developed by whites about blacks.<sup>47</sup> For example, in the 1998 DAS, between 30 to 70 per cent of blacks agreed that the words or phrases 'violent' (32 per cent), 'musical' (63 per cent), 'lazy' (32 per cent), 'athletic' (70 per cent), 'sexually well-endowed' (44 per cent), 'flashy' (68 per cent), and 'welfare-dependent' (30 per cent) are 'more descriptive of Blacks'. Lastly, blacks endorse views on the significance of individual effort as the source of mobility in the United States that are inconsistent with their social status and collective experience.<sup>48</sup>

Nevertheless, groups subordinated along racial, class, or gender lines develop oppositional views, 'good sense', and even counter cultures, as Gramsci pointed out in his work. In the DAS survey, whereas 53 per cent of whites stated that they prefer to live in neighbourhoods that are 'all white' or 'mostly white', 62 per cent of blacks stated that they prefer to live in neighbourhoods that are 'half and half'. In fact, over 70 per cent of white respondents stated that they lived in neighbourhoods that had fewer than 10 per cent blacks at the time of the interview! In terms of busing, 69 per cent of whites opposed it but 74 per cent of blacks supported it. While 56 per cent of whites believe that America has experienced lots of racial progress, only 29 per cent of blacks agree with that view. Since whites believe discrimination is no longer a salient feature of America, only 32 per cent believe blacks have any reason to be angry. In contrast, 76 per cent of blacks believe blacks have reasons to be angry. Finally, on the hot issue of affirmative action, whereas 50 per cent of whites indicate they would support a proposal to eliminate affirmative action, 89 per cent of blacks say they would oppose such a proposal.

The divergent views of whites and blacks in America signify that their social representations are fundamentally shaped by their different group position and experiences in the racial order. Analogously, other subordinate social groups such as workers, peasants, and women have always had alternative ways of 'making sense'. When the counter views of oppressed groups match periods of deep sociopolitical crisis and social upheaval, they can produce fundamental breaks and even revolutionary transformations in the social structure.

*Fifthly, the dominant racial ideology helps normalize racial inequality by*

*portraying the particularistic interests of the dominant race as universal and by instilling social and moral authority over all social actors.* During slavery, for example, slave masters proclaimed that slavery was an extension of family life. Yet slave narratives show that most enslaved Africans did not share these views.<sup>49</sup> Today, however, in the hegemonic period of race relations, the normalization of racial inequality is achieved by explaining race-related matters as the product of non-racial market dynamics. This hegemonic strategy has been relatively successful in *confusing* blacks and *blunting* the oppositional character of their counter views. For example, a third of black Detroiters believed blacks are more likely than whites to be lazy. By buying into this view, many blacks blame themselves for their standing in America in spite of the fact that they recognize the centrality of discrimination. For example, Regina, a homemaker in her fifties, stated she believes discrimination is important and said that being white in America is still an 'Advantage!'. When she was asked, 'why [is it an advantage]?', Regina replied: 'Because of their *colour*'. Yet she answered a question dealing with whether blacks are worse than whites because they are lazy in a self-defeating manner.

Well I don't think they ... [have] ... the proper things to succeed in and ah, but the ones that want to have, they can have. But it's just some people don't want to have anything. They can't blame it on the other person, which I don't. I don't blame anyone 'cause I don't have anything. I blame it on myself 'cause I think I should have did better when I was coming up and got a better education. If I had a chance, I would of.

### Concluding remarks

The reformer seeks to eliminate only the racial aspects of the exploitative system; he [sic] compromises with the system which produces the racial antagonism.

Oliver C. Cox<sup>50</sup>

I advocated in this paper analyzing actors' racial views from the racial ideology standpoint. Traditional survey research is rooted in methodological individualism and assumes that racial beliefs are pathological (i.e. that 'racists' are ignorant or crazy people). As such, this paradigm cannot adequately address—at least in its present form—contemporary ideological constructions which tend to be subtle, couched in a universalistic language, and covered by the mantle of non-racialism. In contrast, the racial ideology paradigm is rooted in the notion that the races constitute different *social groups* with *distinct interests*, and interprets the ideas, views, and affects of actors on racial matters as their *social representations* of how the world is and how it ought to be.

Analysts employing the racial ideology paradigm must do more than just add up individuals' attitudes or affects toward racial 'Others', or count how many individuals support or oppose particular policies.<sup>51</sup> Instead, their primary task must be extricating from textual (e.g. interviews, participant observation, ethnography, films, etc.) as well as survey data the common frames, style, and racial stories used by racial groups to explain their social position. Although surveys

are useful tools for examining actors' racial views, they do not permit the full exploration of all the components of a racial ideology. For instance, it is extremely difficult to draw out the storylines and style used by actors from survey data. Furthermore, surveys do not allow analysts to examine how actors construct accounts and use the building blocks of an ideology in practical situations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that qualitative research is a panacea. First, most qualitative research on racial matters is unsystematic which limits the possibility of generalizing its findings. Secondly, qualitative research can constrain respondents as much as surveys. For example, in interview-based research the questions can be so narrowly constructed that they leave little space for respondents to articulate their views in their own words. Finally, qualitative researchers can over-interpret data as much as survey researchers.

Because of the limitations of these two approaches, I suggest that investigators interested in examining racial ideology must strive to design multi-method studies. One example of this multi-method research design is the 1998 DAS. I used data from this rich data set to illustrate some of the components and social functions of racial ideology. Based on these data, as well as the work of others, I suggested that a new dominant racial ideology has emerged in the post-civil rights era: the ideology of colour blind racism. In general, colour blind racism articulates elements from the free market ideology and culturally-based arguments to justify the contemporary racial order. Although I relied on black/white data to illustrate the main features of colour blind racism, this is the new ideology in the American landscape and affects all actors, blacks, whites, Asians, and Latinos.

Colour blindness is a formidable racial ideology because at worst, it seems like racism 'lite'. Yet, its frames, style, and racial stories are the main ideological elements whites use to explain and justify contemporary racial inequality. As I argued, by supporting equality, fairness, and meritocracy as abstract principles and denying at the same time the existence of systematic discrimination and disregarding the enormous implications of existing racial inequality, whites can appear 'not racist' ('I am all for equal opportunity'), safely criticize any institutional approach to ameliorate racial inequality ('Reverse discrimination!'), and blame minorities for their situation ('If minorities work hard and complain less, they would be doing much better'). Thus the political beauty of colour blindness as an ideology is that it allows whites to state their racial views in a principled, even moral manner.

If colour blindness is the new dominant racial ideology in America, what is the best strategy to fight it? Unlike researchers in the prejudice paradigm, who advocate education or the internalization of new norms as the cure for 'racism', researchers in the racial ideology paradigm focus on resource redistribution and the elimination (or mitigation) of racial caste. Therefore, given the well-documented racial inequalities between blacks and whites in terms of wealth, income, neighbourhood quality and education, as well as the continuing significance of discrimination,<sup>52</sup> I believe that a Marshall-type race-targeted programme and intensive policing against old- and new-fashioned discrimination

will be necessary to eliminate racial inequality and guarantee that blacks and other racial minorities become full citizens of the United States.

My policy prescription amounts precisely to what whites seem most opposed to as social policy: reparations for past and present racial injustices to all minorities. Although some analysts see whites' opposition to race-based policy as a matter of political principle rather than race (see Refs. 28 and 40), I suggested in this article that it is fundamentally a way of opposing racial progress and defending their racial interests. Furthermore, my prescription does not depend on the goodwill or moral character of whites. I suggest that all racial progress in the United States has been accomplished through social protest and the elimination of 'new racism' practices and the ideology of colour blind racism will not be an exception. Hence, what is needed is a new civil rights movement that strives for equality of *status* among the races, that is, a movement to extend the substantive benefits of citizenship for all Americans. All other alternatives in the social policy agenda at this point in time—the reformist proposals of sociologists such as Wilson, Skocpol, and Massey and Denton, the neo-liberal approach of the Clinton Administration, the punitive schemes of the Republican Party and neo-conservatives, or the suggestion by many conservatives and even radical commentators such as Paul Gilroy to abandon race as a category<sup>53</sup>—will reproduce the second-class citizenship of all racial minorities.

### Notes and references

1. Ichus A. Newby, *Jim Crow's Defense: Anti-Negro Thought in America, 1900–1932* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1965), p. 197.
2. Theodore Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958). For a review of the limitations of the prejudice problematic, see Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, *Mapping the Language of Racism* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
3. For a discussion of the changes in the United States' racial structure, see Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Amanda E. Lewis, 'The new racism: racial structure in the United States, 1960s–1990s', in Paul Wong (Ed.), *Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the United States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 55–101.
4. Jim Crow is the name used in the United States to designate race relations during the open segregationist period (from 1865 until the 1960s). The period is called 'Jim Crow' because that name, popularized in a song by Thomas Dartmouth Rice, a white comedian who performed in 'black face', became synonymous with black and all black-related matters such as Jim Crow street cars, Jim Crow fountains, etc.
5. For colonized class dynamics, see Bob Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). For class dynamics causing racial problems, see Lillian Rubin, *Families on the Fault Line: America's Working Class Speaks About the Family, the Economy, Race, and Ethnicity* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994). Lastly, for racial dynamics having their own foundation, see my 'Rethinking racism: toward a structural interpretation', *American Sociological Review*, 62/3 (1997), pp. 465–480.
6. Herbert Blumer, 'Race prejudice as a sense of group position', *The Pacific Sociological Review*, 1/1 (1958), pp. 3–7. An example of work in this Blumerian tradition is Lawrence Bobo and Ryan Smith, 'From Jim Crow racism to laissez-faire racism: an essay on the transformation of racial attitudes in America', in W. Katchin and A. Tyree (Eds), *Beyond Pluralism* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1997).
7. Bonilla-Silva, *op. cit.*, Ref. 5. On the work of Teun A. van Dijk, I use *Prejudice in Discourse: An Analysis of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition and Conversation* (Amsterdam, Netherlands, and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 1984) and *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (London: Sage, 1998).
8. Several authors have used the term 'colour-blindness', for instance Ellis Cose, *Color-Blind: Seeing Beyond Race in a Race-Obsessed World* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997) and Leslie G. Carr, 'Color-blind' Racism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997). However, I want to distinguish my use of the

- concept from theirs. In my analysis, colour blind racism refers to the dominant racial ideology of post-civil rights America. In Ellis Cose's inspired book, colour-blindness is described as a modern fable that the author wishes to disprove. Carr uses the term colour-blind racism to refer to post-civil rights ideology. Although Carr's book is loaded with valuable insights and analyses, his notion of ideology is class-based. However, Carr's analysis is more subtle than most traditionally Marxist analyses of ideology since he acknowledges that whites and blacks form two 'nations' and thus believes that: 'Real race interests are what is at the heart of the racism of the White working class' (p. 39).
9. The 1998 Detroit Area Study is a random sample of 400 white and black Detroit metropolitan area residents. However, most of the data that I present comes from face-to-face structured interviews conducted with a randomly selected sample (21 per cent sample, n = 83) of the respondents who participated in the survey.
  10. Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, edited and with an introduction by C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1985).
  11. Michael George Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 4.
  12. Bonilla-Silva, *op. cit.*, Ref. 5.
  13. Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: Verso 1982). For an effort to study race, class, and gender ideology in post-civil rights America, see Mary Jackman, *Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and Race Relations* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994).
  14. Jorge Larraín, *Ideology and Cultural Identity: Modernity and the Third World Presence* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1994).
  15. Karl Marx, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, edited by David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 192.
  16. Serge Moscovici has provided numerous definitions of social representations. His most recent definition is 'a 'network' of ideas, metaphors and images, more or less loosely tied together, and therefore more mobile and fluid than theories' ('The history and actuality of social representations', p. 244). Although Moscovici is clearly indebted to Durkheim's notion of 'collective representations', his concept is influenced by Marx as well as Weber and is based on the conflictual group-based nature of society. See Serge Moscovici, 'The coming era of social representations', in J. P. Codol and J. P. Leyens (Eds), *Cognitive Approaches to Social Behaviour* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 115–150, and 'The history and actuality of social representations', in Uwe Flick (Ed.), *The Psychology of the Social* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 209–257.
  17. Jeffrey Prager, 'American racial ideology as collective representation', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 5 (1982), pp. 101–102.
  18. Jackman, *op. cit.*, Ref. 13, p. 69, my emphasis.
  19. See Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States* (New York: Routledge, 1994).
  20. Rubin, *op. cit.*, Ref. 5, p. 188.
  21. Teun van Dijk, 'Elite discourse and the reproduction of racism', in Rita Kirk Whillock and David Slayden (Eds), *Hate Speech* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 5.
  22. Noel Ignatiev and John Garvey, 'Introduction: a beginning', in Noel Ignatiev and John Garvey (Eds), *Race Traitor* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
  23. Bonilla-Silva, *op. cit.*, Ref. 7.
  24. Wetherell and Potter, *op. cit.*, Ref. 2, define interpretative repertoires as 'systems of signification' composed of 'clusters of terms, descriptions, and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images'. They are 'resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions' (pp. 90–91). These repertoires, the textual foundation of any ideology, allow users to achieve political goals in communicative situations. The direct citation in the text appears on p. 90.
  25. In addition to my own work (see Ref. 3), see Robert L. Brooks, *Rethinking the American Race Problem* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), and Robert C. Smith, *Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995).
  26. For a recent detailed discussion, see chapter 4 of Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
  27. Bobo and Smith, *op. cit.*, Ref. 6. On 'competitive racism', see Philomena Essed, *Diversity: Gender, Color, and Culture* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996). On resentment, see Donald Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (London and Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
  28. The classic statement of this viewpoint is Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, *The Scare of Race* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). For a restatement from the British perspective, see Martin Gilens, Paul Sniderman, and James H. Kuklinski, 'Affirmative action and the politics of realignment', *British Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1998), pp. 159–183.

29. On residential segregation, see Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, *American Apartheid* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). On school segregation, see Gary Orfield and Susan Eaton, *Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of 'Brown v. Board of Education'* (New York: The New Press, 1996).
30. For an example, on Latinos, see David Montejano, *Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836–1986* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987). For examples on blacks, see Charles S. Johnson, *Patterns of Negro Segregation* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1943).
31. For a detailed account, see Bonilla-Silva, *op. cit.*, Ref. 26.
32. Sam Keen, *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 21.
33. Benjamin DeMott, *The Trouble With Friendship: Why Americans Can't Think Straight About Race* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), p. 64–65, my emphasis.
34. Louis Althusser, *Posiciones* (Mexico, DF: Editorial Grijalbo, 1976).
35. Giddens's notion of 'structuration' is useful here. Rather than positing that structures determine superstructures, or that actors' actions determine structures, or that structures determine actors, the idea of *each being constituted in and through recurrent practices* seems more productive. Thus, I conceive racial ideology and racial structure as mutually reinforcing each other. Both change through the 'racial contestation' of actors in a racialized social system.
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37. David Theo Goldberg, *Racial Subjects: Writing on Race in America* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 37.
38. Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Movements in America* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).
39. Robin D. G. Kelley, *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class* (New York: The Free Press, 1997).
40. The work cited above by Sniderman and Gilens in Ref. 28 has been debunked by, among others, David O. Sears, Colette van Laar, Mary Carrillo, and Rick Kosterman, 'Is it really racism? The origins of white Americans' opposition to race-targeted policies', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61/1 (1997), pp. 16–53.
41. Johnson, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 194, my emphasis.
42. Examples in Jody David Armour, *Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism: The Hidden Costs of Being Black in America* (London and New York: New York University Press, 1997).
43. On racial identity, see Joane Nagel, 'Constructing ethnicity: creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture', in *Social Problems*, 41/1 (1994), pp. 152–176, and Beverly D. Tatum, *Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? And Other Conversations About Race* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
44. On Latin America and the Caribbean, see Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, 'The essential social fact of race: a reply to Loveman', *American Sociological Review*, 64/6 (1999), pp. 899–906. On whiteness in the United States, see Ruth Frankenberg, *The Social Construction of Whiteness: White Women, Race Matters* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), and Ian F. Haney López, *White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race* (London and New York: New York University Press, 1997).
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48. Siegelman and Welch, *ibid.* Refer also to Jennifer Hochschild, *Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
49. Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990).
50. Oliver C. Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race: A Study on Social Dynamics* (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1945), p. 545.
51. Prager, *op. cit.*, Ref. 17; Wetherall and Potter, *op. cit.*, Ref. 2.
52. For a good review of all these matters, see chapter 4 of my *White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 26.
53. For reformist proposals, see William J. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997), Stanley E. Greenberg and Theda Skocpol, *The New Majority* (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), and Massey and Denton, *op. cit.*, Ref. 29. The reference to Paul Gilroy is to his recent *Against Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

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